Primary voters are frequently characterized as an ideologically extreme subset of their party, and thus partially responsible for increasing party polarization in government. We combine administrative records on primary turnout with five recent surveys from 2008-2014. We find that primary voters are similar to rank and file voters in their party in terms of demographic attributes and policy attitudes. These similarities do not vary depending on the openness of the primary. Our results suggest that the composition of primary electorates does not exert a polarizing e↵ect above what might arise from voters in the party as a whole.
Two particular concerns among commentators and some scholars are that primary voters are ideologically extreme, and that their influence in the nominating process produces ideologically extreme candidates and more polarization between the parties in Congress and state legislatures. For this reason, some advocates argue that reducing polarization necessitates reform to the primary process.
In this paper, we examine whether primary voters are an ideologically extreme subset of their party. Drawing on validated turnout data married to five large surveys conducted between 2008 and 2014, we show that primary voters are not demographically distinct or ideologically extreme compared to those who identify with the party or voted for its presidential candidate in the general election, or than those who identify with the party and voted in the general election but not in the primary. The only substantial di↵erence is that primary voters report more interest in politics. These patterns emerge in both presidential and midterm years. These patterns also emerge regardless of whether primaries allow independents and out-partisans to participate.
Of course, our findings cannot speak to the impact of simply having a party nomination process prior to the general election. Nor can we compare primary elections to other types of nomination processes-such as conventions, caucuses, or smoke-filled backrooms.
Nonetheless, we provide considerable evidence that primary electorates are not ideologically unrepresentative of the broader party.
The Characteristics of Primary Voters
Despite consistent skepticism about the representativeness of primary electorates, early research challenged this view. Drawing on data from 1976 and 1980 elections, Geer (1988 and Norrander (1989) found that a party's primary voters were not more ideological or partisan than general election voters who identified with that party or voted for its presidential candidate-what Geer called the "party following"-or than general election voters in the party who did not vote in the primary. Norrander concludes: "Fears about extremist primary voters selecting extremist candidates unpalatable to the more moderate general election voters are unsupported. Primary voters just are not more ideologically extreme" (584).
Since this research was conducted, however, primary turnout has declined (Hirano et al., 2010 ) and the parties have become better ideologically sorted (Fiorina and Levendusky, 2006) . These changes in the composition of the parties raise the possibility that the primary electorate is no longer representative of rank and file partisans. Two recent studies suggests this could be true. Drawing on the 2010 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), finds that self-reported Republican primary voters in that election year were more ideologically extreme than self-reported general election voters who say they did not vote in those primaries. Hill (2015) draws on the 2010 and 2012 CCES, but uses validated rather than self-reported turnout data. His findings are mixed: raw estimates show little di↵erence between primary voters and the broader party, but estimates from a hierarchical model of policy attitudes reveal larger di↵erences. He argues "primary voters and primary electorates are less centrist...than party voters in the general electorate" (482).
Data
We use data from five large surveys of the American public: the 2008 Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project (CCAP) 
Comparing Primary and General Election Voters
We compare primary voters to two definitions of "the party" found in previous literature:
(1) general election voters who self-identify with a party or voted for that party's candidate in the general election; and (2) tivists, we might expect them to be older, better educated, and more interested in politics.
But although primary voters were about 6-8 years older than those who voted only in the general election, they were only 1-4 years older than the broader party. Primary voters were also only a few points more likely to have a college degree than those who voted only in the general election or than the party following. Larger di↵erences emerge with regard to campaign interest and campaign donations. For example, 63% of Democratic presidential primary voters in the 2008 election said they were very interested in the campaign, compared to 44% of those who voted in the general election but not the primary. This gap appears among Republicans and in other elections as well.
But any di↵erences in campaign or political interest do not translate into large di↵erences in three di↵erent measures of political attitudes. In these elections, the average Democratic primary voter's self-reported symbolic ideology on a five-point scale from very liberal to very conservative was only slightly to the left of Democrats who voted in the general election but Table 1 ). The di↵erences among Republicans were slightly larger but still small in absolute terms. There were similarly modest di↵erences in congressional elections (Table 2 ).
There are also small di↵erences in issue positions among these groups, and not always in the direction that the conventional wisdom would presume. Why do these results di↵er from those of Jacobson (2012) and Hill (2015) , even though we are analyzing some of the same surveys? In contrast to Jacobson (2012) , we use validated turnout data. As we describe in the appendix, self-reported turnout produces larger di↵erences between primary voters and the party following (see also . And unlike Hill (2015), we rely on simple disaggregated means and very large sample sizes, rather than a hierarchical model. Even though there were few substantive di↵erences between primary voters and the party following, larger di↵erences might emerge in particular types of primaries. Table 3 Kaufmann, Gimpel, and Ho↵man, 2003; Hill, 2015) . As Kaufman and colleagues conclude: "...the key to greater ideological representativeness is not the rules alone" (472).
5 Hill (2015) uses a hierarchical model in order to achieve greater precision in his estimates of opinion in congressional districts. This approach, however, may trade o↵ lower variance for higher bias, as suggested by the divergence between the modeled results and national level results using larger samples. The other results in Hill (2015) line up closely with our results here.
Conclusions
In 1956, V.O. Key wrote skeptically about the primary system: "The elevation of such minorities to power within the nominating process through the smallness of total participation and bias may ... throw into o ce the most improbable sorts of characters who have won nominations through the vagaries of primaries" (166). That skepticism has persisted for many years. After the 1984 presidential election, a supporter of Jack Kemp said "The Republican presidential primary process remains a right-wing orgy" (Baker, 1985) . After the 2012 election Republicans worried that primaries "push their presidential nominees far to the right"
and "produce lackluster Senate candidates" (Martin, 2013 Norrander's (2015, 57 ) review of prior work that "rather than being a more ideologically extreme proportion of the electorate, presidential primary voters are more aptly described as the slightly more interested and knowledgeable segment of the electorate." This helps explain why extant research has found little connection between either the existence or type of primaries and polarization (Hirano et al., 2010; McGhee et al., 2013) . To be sure, our claim is not that primaries have no consequences for the candidates who run and the candidates who win. Moreover, primaries might be problematic for other reasons, such as that they do not provide su cient deliberation within the party or a thorough enough review of each candidate's qualifications (Polsby, 1983) . Nevertheless, our findings should serve to allay one concern about primary elections: that they empower ideological extremists within the parties. To estimate voters' ideological positions, we assume that all survey respondents have a quadratic utility function with normal errors (Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers, 2004) . Each item presents individuals with a choice between a "Yes" position and a "No" position. 2 We use the two-parameter IRT model introduced to political science by Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004) , which characterizes each response y ij 2 {0, 1} as a function of subject i's latent ability (x i ), the di culty (↵ j ) and discrimination ( j ) of item j, and an error term (e ij ), where
where is the standard normal CDF. j is referred to as the "discrimination" parameter because it captures the degree to which the latent trait a↵ects the probability of a yes answer. The "cut point" is the value of ↵ j / j at which the probabilities of answering yes or no to a question are 50-50. We assume a one-dimensional policy space because a twodimensional model shows little improvement in terms of model fit. The ideal point, x, for individual i signifies the "liberalness" or "conservativeness" of that individual. We orient our values so that lower values are associated with more liberal preferences and higher values with more conservative preferences. We approximate the joint posterior density of the model Table 1 shows the strong relationship between symbolic ideology and our scaled measure of citizens' ideal points.
Appendix B: Voter File Matching Process
We use data from five large-scale surveys of the American public: the 2008 Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project (CCAP) ) and the 2008-2014 CCES (Vavreck and Rivers, 2008; Ansolabehere and Rivers, 2013) . Once sample weights are applied, CCAP respondents are representative of registered voters and CCES respondents are representative of the American public.
The matching of our surveys to voter files was conducted by the survey provider YouGov in conjunction with the voter file firm Catalist (see , for a detailed description of this process). Cell entries are the weighted number of respondents with column percentages in parentheses. Norrander, 1989) rely on data about verified voters-via exit polls and validated vote measures in the ANES, respectively. Jacobson (2012) relies on self-reported turnout, as do some other studies (Butler, 2009; Peress, 2013) .
Jacobson acknowledges that, as in many surveys in which turnout is assessed via self-reports, respondents to the 2010 CCES over-reported turnout (Vavreck, 2007) . But he argues that "comparisons across participation categories remain informative" (1615). However, introducing validated voting data can indeed alter comparisons across categories of participation.
As Ansolabehere and Hersh (2011) show in their study of general election voters and nonvoters, using validated turnout data reduces the (already small) ideological gaps between these groups.
We can also show the importance of using validated turnout in making these comparisons.
In Table 3 , we focus on the di↵erences between the views of primary voters and general election-only voters on the six policy questions in the 2008 CCAP-calculated in percentage points. We present the di↵erences separately for each party and using both validated and self-reported turnout in the primary and general. Using self-reported turnout usually exaggerates the di↵erence between these two groups, much as it exaggerates the di↵erence between general election voters and non-voters. For example, among Republicans validated primary voters are only 4 points more supportive of deporting illegal immigrants, compared to those who voted only in the general election.
Among self-reported voters, that di↵erence balloons to 20 points. The same pattern obtains among Democrats on several issues, including support for government health insurance, withdrawal from Iraq, and raising taxes on the wealthy.
These di↵erences between validated and self-reported turnout may be one reason for the di↵erences in the findings of and Norrander (1989) on the one hand, and
Jacobson (2012) on the other. More generally, these di↵erences suggest that self-reported turnout data are problematic for comparing primary and general electorates and artificially inflate the level of polarization.
